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Well, I grant that there are indeed these ineffable, unanswerable
questions—but who ever promised me that there wouldn’t be
such questions? The worst part of being a quidditist, I guess, is
that I am in danger of agreeing with Kant about something (Kant




Sagredo. I spent a lot of time working on an anthology of philosophical
horror that I am editing, The Human Serpent is Over Everything: An
Anthology of Philosophical Horror. I am not sure that’s the right title,
though. I would prefer something longer and more obscurely allusive.
Salviati. I know what you mean. All of my manuscripts are entitled
“Miscellaneous Tracts on Some Curious, and Very Interesting Subjects in
Mechanics, Physical-Astronomy, and Speculative Mathematics,” until
some well-meaning editor gets involved. Your project sounds very odd.
Sagredo. Yes! So far as I can tell, what really creeps out most scientists
and philosophers of science is the idea that the world as described by
science is at least partially constituted by the mental. I want to publish
a collection of quaint philosophical writing in this vein—I reckon that
horror of any sort will be a huge money maker again next time we have
a plague year.
Salviati. Unquestionably. But why ‘quaint’?
. To appear in Y. Ben-Menahem (Ed.), Rethinking the Concept of Laws of Nature.
Sagredo. Well, these days it is sociologists that come out with the re-
ally scary stuff—you know, the stuff that gets Nobel Prize winners to
complain about philosophers. But back in the day, it was philosophers
who provoked scientists to complain about philosophers. Think of the
conventionalist-pragmatist-Bergsonian positivism of Le Roy, according
to which scientific facts are made by the scientists who observe them,
rather than being externally imposed. It sounds even better in French,
especially if you leave out most of the words: les faits sont faits.
Salviati. Most things do. Is this the same Le Roy that drove Poincaré
to fantasize about strange alien beings and to argue that their science
would coincide with our own?
Sagredo. Yes, that’s the one. It seems that an exposure to a certain sort
of horror drives a certain sort of person to a certain sort of science
fiction, as a way of affirming their unshakable confidence in the ob-
jectivity of science. Mach’s phenomenalist positivism drove Planck to
pronouncements on the inevitable congruence between human and
Martian science.
Simplicio. Planck’s student Schlick followed a similar path.
Salviati. Okay. But I am still puzzled by the ‘quant’ bit. Some of the
most influential, interesting, and widely-read philosophers seem like
good candidates for your anthology, if I understand what it is all about.
Sagredo. Well, I am certainly going to include Peirce. Perhaps that is
who you are thinking of? He famously tells us that:
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented
in this opinion is the real.
This is pretty spooky! For one thing, it seems to imply that there can
be no buried secrets, facts about the past that it is beyond our power
to discover. But then to counter the spookiness, he elsewhere turns to
science fiction. He tells us that it is at least possible that some facts that
we might think would be buried forever could nonetheless come to
light: perhaps beings of a distant planet have recorded historical events
on Earth and the recordings will come into our possession. In general,
he seems to have really enjoyed a good science fiction tale:
if we ever succeed in interpreting the communications of the
inhabitants of Mars, I will risk a nickel that their first dispatch
will read: ‘O yes, we know all about your attempts to learn from
us. Well learn this: you are the most stupid of all organized
beings. You even allow creatures to have a voice or a vote in your
government who hardly can solve a partial differential equation
in its generality and have not mastered the higher reaches of the
calculus of variations. Bring a diploma from a colony of bees
before you presume to seek instruction from Martians!’
Salviati. I am glad you are including Peirce! But I had others in mind.
Sagredo. Pray tell.
Salviati. Let me introduce a technical notion: a ratbag idealist is someone
who takes some pretheoretically fundamental aspect of the world—its
causal structure, or its laws, or its spatiotemporal geometry—to depend
on human cognitive constitution.
Simplicio. Of course, this notion is due to Lewis—although he only
mentions the possibility of ratbag idealism concerning laws—and he
has a decisive argument that the correct account of laws saves us from
ratbag idealism.
Salviati. Let us come back to Lewis. First . . .
Sagredo. What is a ‘ratbag,’ exactly?
Simplicio. No one knows, except Australians. Sometimes they say a rat-
bag is a lunatic, sometimes a loveable rascal, sometimes a troublemaker.
It is hard to know exactly what Lewis had in mind when he introduced
ratbag idealists about laws:
Now, some ratbag idealist might say that if we don’t like the
misfortunes that the laws of nature visit upon us, we can change
the laws—in fact, we can make them always have been different-
just by changing the way we think! (Talk about the power of
positive thinking.) It would be very bad if my analysis endorsed
such lunacy.
Salviati. First, Sagredo, are my ratbag idealists the sort of characters that
you are interested in?
Sagredo. I am unsure because I don’t know how to think of the notion
of dependence that figures in your characterization of ratbaggery.
Salviati. Let us agree to think of it this way: a good test of whether
someone might be a ratbag idealist is whether they think that, for all
we know, there may be other beings differently constituted, for whom
geometry, or laws, or causal facts might be different.
Sagredo. Agreed. Then your ratbag idealists are exactly the sort of people
I have in mind. Doesn’t it give you goosebumps just thinking about
people like that?
Salviati. Thinking about Kant gives you goosebumps? I think that might
be unusual.
Sagredo. I guess I wasn’t really thinking of Kant. I have my doubts that
he was a ratbag idealist.
Salviati. Hmm. Perhaps we can continue our discussion on that point
tomorrow.
Second Day
Salviati. Consider terms in which Kant explains the transcendental
ideality of space in the Critique of Pure Reason.
We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so
on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the
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subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer
intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by
objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all.
(A26/B42)
Since we cannot make the special conditions of sensibility into
conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their appear-
ances, we can well say that space comprehends all things that
may appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves,
whether they be intuited or not, or by whatever subject they may
be intuited. For we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of
other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit
our intuition and that are universally valid for us. (A27/B43)
This is a form of ratbag idealism.
Sagredo. Very nice! But I hardly think that Kant, in the 18th century,
would have had space aliens in mind.
Salviati. As someone in the habit of flipping to final pages of long books
to find out how they end, I can assure you that Kant did like to think
about space aliens. Having observed that asking someone to back up a
pronouncement of belief with a wager is a good way to help them to
clarify how strongly held their belief really is, Kant tells us that
If it were possible to settle by any sort of experience whether
there are inhabitants of at least some of the planets that we see, I
might well bet everything that I have on it. Hence I say that it is
not merely an opinion but a strong belief (on the correctness of
which I would wager many advantages in life) that there are also
inhabitants of other worlds. (A825/B853)
Sagredo. I don’t know whether to be more surprised that Kant was so
sure that we had company or that he didn’t disapprove of betting.
Simplicio. Kant’s chum Heilsberg recalled that as undergraduates, they
and another chap, Wlömer, made enough money at billiards that even-
tually they could no longer find anyone to play against—at which point
they switched to the card game l’hombre. After Kant’s death, his house
became a student tavern, Au Billard Royal, complete with a bowling-alley
and a billiards-room.
Salviati. So far as extra-terrestrials go, there is more. His early essay,
“Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, or, Essay on
the Constitution and the Mechanical Origin of the Whole Universe
according to Newtonian Principles,” shows that Kant liked to think
about space aliens a lot.
There Kant takes space to be infinite and Euclidean, of course, but he
also takes the material world to have a centre of attraction at which the
density of matter achieves its maximum, with average matter density
falling off as one travels away from this point (1: 311 f.). He thinks that
inhabited planets can be found throughout infinite space. Further, since
there is a lower bound to the possible degree of intellectual perfection
of a spiritual being, but no upper bound on the intellectual perfection
of such a being,
if a law is to be in place according to which the domiciles of
intelligent creatures are distributed in the order of their relation
to the common centre point, we shall have to place the lowest
and least complete type that constitutes, as it were, the beginning
of the type of the spiritual world, at that region that can be called
the beginning of the entire universe in order to fill simultaneously
with this and in equal progression all infinity of time and spaces
with increasing degrees of perfection of the capacity to think
and as it were gradually to approach the goal of the highest
excellence, namely the divinity without, however, ever being able
to attain it. (1: 331).
Kant sees a related hierarchy within our solar system.
The material of which the inhabitants of different planets, indeed even
the animals and plants on them, are formed must altogether be of a
lighter and finer type and the elasticity of the fibres together with the
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advantageous arrangement of their build be more perfect the further
away they are away from the Sun. (1: 358)
And the gradations in material fineness and elasticity are reflected in
intellectual and moral gradations. For Kant, there are of course only six
planets in the solar system: Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, and
Saturn.
Human nature, which occupies as it were the middle rung on the
ladder of beings, sees itself as being between between the two
extreme limits of perfection, equally distant from both ends. If
the idea of the most sublime classes of of rational creatures that
inhabit Jupiter or Saturn arouses their jealousy and humiliates
them by the knowledge of their own baseness, then they can be
satisfied again and comforted by the sight of the low stages on
the planets Venus and Mercury, which are lowered far below the
the perfection of human nature. (1: 359)
Simplicio. Elsewhere, Kant suggests that if only our sense organs were
more fine, we could perceive magnetic fields (A226/B273).
Sagredo. Very well—as far as the stuff about space aliens goes, I am
happy to concede that Kant positively relished the idea that we are not
alone. But I simply do not believe that the possibility of aliens whose
space and time are different from ours is what Kant was alluding to in
the passages you started us with today. Indeed, I recall once sitting next
to a Kant scholar at dinner who assured me that in passages like this
Kant has in mind God, for whom there is no space and there is no time.
For consider Kant’s distinction (B144–B150) between sensible and
intellectual intuition and his account of their respective relation to the
understanding. In beings like ourselves, the understanding operates
on material given to it via sensible intuition, and in this way cognizes
objects in space and time. We can distinguish between two types of
sensible intuition: pure intuition (space and time, the forms of sensible
intuition) and empirical intuition (the contribution of sensation). For a
being like God, however, understanding is itself intuited and to cognize
an object is to produce that object. For such a being, nothing is externally
given. There is no sensation, no sensible intuition, no form of sensible
intuition—there is no space and no time. Kant later tells us that even
the possibility of intellectual intuition is something that we cannot
understand (B307).
This is what is going on when he tells us that “we cannot judge at
all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the
same conditions that limit our intuition and that are universally valid
for us.” He has in mind not beings whose forms of sensible intuition
are different from our own, but a Being whose intuition is not sensible
at all.
Salviati. I have heard people say that. But I think that there are some
texts that are difficult to square with such a reading.
One is a note that Kant inserted in his copy of the first edition of the
Critique, immediately following the first passage that we started with
today.
Perhaps all created beings are bound to it, that we do not know.
This much one can know, that it is a merely sensible form. The
most important thing is that it yields a determinate concept a
priori, and through inner intuition we would not have sensations,
thus no empirical representations and no science of objects a
priori.
The question raised here is not whether space and time are forms of
sensible intuition for God (the one being with intellectual rather then
sensible intuition), but rather whether space and time are forms of
sensible intuition for all ordinary cognizing beings, or just for humans.
The second example, new to the second edition, is General Remark
IV of the Transcendental Aesthetic (B71 f.).
In the first half of this Remark, Kant observes that in natural theology,
one does not regard space and time as conditions of the intuition of God.
He then notes that this means that they therefore cannot be regarded as
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objective forms of all things—since if they were such, the intuitions of
God would need to be subject to them. The natural option, then, is to
regard them as forms of sensible intuition—that type of intuition which
is dependent on the separate existence of objects, to be distinguished
from that type of intuition (here called original intuition), which would
appear to pertain only to God (the original being), through which objects
are given.
In the second half of the Remark, Kant tells us, as clearly as he
can, that for all we know, we may share our world with beings for
whom space and time are not the same as they are for us—and also
distinguishes, as clearly as he can, between this thought and the thought
that for God there is no space and time.
It is also not necessary for us to limit the kind of intuition in
space and time to the sensibility of human beings; it may well
be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with
human beings in this regard (though we cannot decide this), yet
even given such universal validity this kind of intuition would
not cease to be sensibility, for the very reason that it is derived
(intuitus derivativus), not original (intuitius originarius), thus not
intellectual intuition, which for the ground already adduced
seems to pertain only to the original being, never to one that is
dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (which
determines its existence in relation to given objects); although
the last remark must be counted only as an illustration of our
aesthetic theory and not as a ground of its proof.
Sagredo. This is disappointingly convincing. It seems that Kant is more
correct, more trivial, and more Anglo-Saxon than I took him to be.
Salviati. But still deeply weird! In the second edition version of the
Transcendental Deduction, he makes it clear that his ratbaggery extends
even to the categories—and so to the causal structure of the world of
experience.
But for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to
bring about the unity of apperception a priori only by means of
the categories and only through precisely this kind and number
of them, a further ground may be offered just as little as one
can be offered for why we have precisely these and no other
functions for judgment or for why space and time are the sole
forms of our possible intuition. (B145 f.)
Sagredo. Now you have gone too far! It sounds like you are attributing to
Kant a view on which the categories are merely psychological apparatus
with which we happen to find ourselves equipped. But Kant explicitly
tells us that
the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent
under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on
a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in us, of combining
certain empirical representations according to such a rule of
relation I would not be able to say that the effect is combined
with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am
so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise
than as so connected; which is precisely what the skeptic wishes
most. . . . (B168)
Salviati. Ah! Perhaps it will help to zoom out a bit from the passage you
quote. In the final section of the revised version of the Transcendental
Deduction, Kant considers three accounts of the origins of our concepts
and he links these with three accounts of the generation of living beings,
which he calls generatio aequivoca, epigenesis, and preformation.
Simplicio. Kant lived at a time of radical transformation in the scien-
tific understanding of embryology. Kant himself shifted his views on
this topic over time. In this he was certainly influenced, to some ex-
tent, by his younger contemporary Blumenbach. In the first edition
of his famous work on Bildungstrieb Blumenbach defends the prefor-
mation account (and reports that boys in the Middle East are born
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pre-circumcised). In the second edition, admired by Kant, Blumenbach
defends epigenesis (and discusses jackelopes).
Sagredo. You seem very well-informed, Simplicio. Perhaps you could tell
me a bit more about what Kant might have had in mind in mentioning
these accounts of the growth and development of organisms?
Simplicio. On the epigenetic account, an individual animal or plant
develops out of material that is initially formless, with the form of
the individual emerging gradually over time. On the preformation
account, each animal or plant is fully formed from the moment it comes
into being (which on, some versions of this theory, is when the first
member of its species comes into being—on one such version, each
human is preformed in a seed in a seed in a seed . . . in Adam, on
another, each is preformed in an egg in an egg in an egg . . . in Eve).
The term generatio aequivoca has a tangled history of use. But in a
footnote to §80 of the Critique of Judgement (5: 419 f.), Kant distinguishes
between generatio homonyma, in which the being produced is of the
same kind as those which produce it, and generatio heteronyma, in which
the being produced is of a different kind. Kant recognizes two types of
generatio heteronyma: generatio univoca, in which organic things gives rise
to organic things of different types (as a far-fetched possible example,
he suggests a scenario in which, over the course of generations, aquatic
animals become terrestrial animals), and generatio aequivoca in which
a living being arises out of non-living matter. By way of illustration,
consider an interesting case discussed by Blumenbach. The pimple-
worm (Hydatis finna) is found only in domestic varieties of swine,
never in wild varieties. Now, we can be sure that domestic swine are
descendants of wild swine. So it is reasonable to assume that the first
pimple-worms originated some time after the first domestication of
swine. So here we have a case generatio heteronyma: either these first
pimple-worms had no parents (generatio aequivoca) or had parents of
some other species (generatio univoca).
Salviati. That is an interesting case. But let us leave the pimple-worms
alone for the time being. Naturally, Kant compares the empiricist ac-
count of concept formation with the notion of generatio aequivoca: the
categories and the pure forms of sensible intuition are a priori and
cannot be the result of experience. His own account is compared with
epigenesis: the categories “contain the grounds of the possibility of
all experience in general from the side of the understanding.” A third
approach is compared with preformation, an approach on which “sub-
jective predispositions for thinking, implanted in us along with our
existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree exactly
with the laws of nature along which experience runs. . . .” It is this third
approach that is subject to the objection levelled in the passage that you
quoted to us, Sagredo.
Sagredo. Wait—I am having a little trouble picturing how this preforma-
tionist view is supposed to work. Does Kant have somebody in mind
here?
Salviati. It appears that he does: in the corresponding passage in the
Prolegomena, he mentions Crusius (4: 320 n.). I suspect that Simplicio
could tell us a thing or two about him?
Simplicio. The semi-empiricist, semi-rationalist system of Crusius is
extremely interesting. In his Sketch of the Necessary Truths of Reason,
he identifies the principle of the inseparable, according to which it is
genuinely impossible to separate things which cannot be separated in
our thought, and the principle of the uncombinable, according to which
it is genuinely impossible to combine things that cannot be combined
in our thought. These principles go beyond mere logic: indeed, it is
not just that their denial entails no contradiction, we can even imagine
beings whose thought is not governed by them. It is his view that each
thing that comes into existence has a cause, that this follows from the
principles of human reason, and that it does not follow from logic alone.
Special cases aside, “the essence of our understanding is the criterion
of truth.”
Salviati. Excellent. It is that sort of view that Kant is complaining about
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in the passage that you pointed us towards, Sagredo. Recall that there
he says that on a preformation view “I would not be able to say that the
effect is combined with the cause in the object: (i.e., necessarily), but
only that I am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation
otherwise than as so connected. . . .” Of course, we are to understand
that on Kant’s own account, we can say that the effect is combined with
the cause in the object, because under transcendental idealism, the cate-
gories are constitutive of experience. Things are quite different on the
preformation view: on this view, our thought is required to mirror the
causal relation between things in themselves rather than the structure
of appearances: but as Kant tells us, “there are only two ways in which
a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects can
be thought: either the experience makes these concepts possible or these
concepts make the experience possible” (of course, closer examination
shows the former to be unacceptable). The preformation view doesn’t
fall under either of those conditions—and it is for this reason that it
renders the concept of cause false. So his point is not that there is
something wrong with views on which it is at least notionally possible
for distinct types of beings to be equipped with different systems of
categories—it is, rather, that there is something wrong with any view,
empiricist or preformationist, on which in order for us to know that
the same cause always produces the same effect, we must know that
the structure of a mind-independent world obeys the causal principle(s)
implicit in the structure of our minds.
This point is, arguably, more clearly expressed in the corresponding
passage in the first edition (A128 f.). If the objects our cognition were
things in themselves, could we have a priori concept of them? No. For
either these concepts would derive from experience or from ourselves.
Clearly, the first of these options would not lead to a priori concepts
(generatio aequivoca again). Neither would the the second:
If we take them from ourselves, then that which is merely in us
cannot determine the constitution of an object distinct from our
representations, i.e., be a ground why there should be a thing
that corresponds to something we have in our thoughts, and why
all this representation should not instead be empty.
The solution, of course, is to take the objects of experience to be mere
appearances rather than things in themselves.
Sagredo. Hummph. That is enough for me for one day, I think.
Third Day
Simplicio. Can we finally talk about Lewis?
Salviati. Yes! Perhaps we can begin by agreeing that Lewis is a ratbag
idealist about laws of nature?
Simplicio. That is just what I deny—because Lewis denies it.
Salviati. Let us begin at the beginning, then. In his earliest published
discussion of laws of nature, Lewis suggests that
a contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it
appears as a theorem (or axiom) of each of the true deductive sys-
tems that achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength.
(73)
Sagredo. This is a very interesting idea! But what has been done in
the intervening years to substantiate Lewis’s bold conjecture that the
required intersubjective notions of simplicity and balance between
simplicity and strength exist?
Salviati. Hmm. I suspect that it will not be fruitful to pursue that line of
questioning here.
Simplicio. I disagree.
Sagredo. Good. Rather than considering laws of nature, suppose that
we consider a simpler case that is under better conceptual control:
geometry. Suppose that someone were to conjecture that there is a
natural intersubjective simplicity ordering on geometries. That would
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be very interesting! But a problem would immediately arise: it is not
hard to find experts disagreeing about which of the classical geometries
is simplest—Euclidean geometry, hyperbolic geometry, and elliptic
geometry each has its fans.
Simplicio. Granted. But I am confident that we will not find the same
thing in the more complicated setting of laws of nature. Also, many
fans of the best-system approach take talk of best balance between
simplicity and strength to be a place-holder for some more subtle story
about how scientists use data to choose between theories—and I think
you will agree that there is little disagreement among expert scientists
about which hypotheses are best-supported by data. Also, even if our
program does rely on an unsubstantiated empirical conjecture, it is still
a better philosophical account than its extant competitors. So it is the
best choice among our available options—and after all, each of us does
need to choose a favourite account of laws of nature, or where would
we be?
Sagredo. I see.
Salviati. Yes. Let us return to Lewis. After the passage quoted above, he
goes on to make the obvious explicit when he suggests that we think of
the system of truths that best balances simplicity and strength in the
following terms:
Imagine that God had decided to provide mankind with a Concise
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, chosen according to His standards
of truthfulness and our standards of simplicity and strength. (74)
The notions of simplicity and of balance between simplicity and strength
are at best species-relative. So, on the best-system approach, the notion
of a law of nature is likewise species-relative. Lewis is a ratbag idealist
about laws of nature.
Simplicio. I feel compelled to point out that Lewis has a response:
it does not follow that lawhood depends on us in the most
straightforward way: namely, that if our standards were suit-
ably different, then the laws would be different. For we can take
our actual standards as fixed, and apply them in asking what
the laws would be in various counterfactual situations, includ-
ing in counterfactual situations in which people have different
standards—or in which there are no people at all. (123)
Sagredo. I don’t see how rigidification will help Lewis here. Suppose
that elsewhere in the galaxy there is a species of brainiacs who stand
to us as we stand to dogs, intellectually. We can consider three sets of
true generalizations at our world: the d-laws that are consequences of
the set of truths that best balance simplicity and strength according to
dogs; the h-laws that are consequences of the set of truths that best
balance simplicity and strength according to humans; and the b-laws
that are consequences of the set of truths that best balance simplicity
and strength according to brainiacs. We can, if we like, insist that the
word ‘law’ in our mouths always picks out the h-laws, even when we
are entertaining counterfactual scenarios in which we come to have the
intellectual capacities of dogs or brainiacs—but this is not to say that
brainiac science would or should be concerned with h-laws rather than
b-laws.
Salviati. Yes. Lewis himself seems to have come around to this assess-
ment.
I used to think that rigidification came to the rescue: in talking
about what the laws would be if we changed our thinking, we use
not our hypothetical new standards of simplicity and strength
and balance, but our actual and present standards. But now I
think this is a cosmetic remedy only. It doesn’t make the problem
go away, it only makes it harder to state. (232)
Simplicio. I know all that, of course—but there is nothing I can do in the
face of my compulsion to mention rigidification every time the spectre
of ratbag idealism is raised. But now we can enjoy Lewis’s decisive
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rebuttal:
Maybe some of the exchange rates between aspects of simplicity,
etc., are a psychological matter, but not just anything goes. If
nature is kind, the best system will be robustly best—so far ahead
of its rivals that it will come out first under any standards of
simplicity and strength and balance. We have no guarantee that
nature is kind in this way, but no evidence that it isn’t. It’s a
reasonable hope. Perhaps we presuppose it in our thinking about
law. I can admit that if nature were unkind, and if disagreeing
rival systems were running neck-and-neck, then lawhood might
be a psychological matter, and that would be very peculiar. I can
even, concede that in that case the theorems of the barely-best
system would not very well deserve the name of laws. But I’d
blame the trouble on unkind nature, not on the analysis; and I
suggest we not cross these bridges unless we come to them. (232
f.)
I think you will agree that that settles the matter. Lewis is not a ratbag
idealist about laws.
Sagredo. I am a little puzzled by this, frankly. Let us return to something
you said a little while ago, Simplicio. You remarked that there is little
disagreement between experts about how to choose theories in light of
evidence. I found that claim surprising. Dirac famously thought that
one ought to prefer the more mathematically beautiful theory whether
or not it was simpler than its competitors. In this, he self-consciously
departed from the standards of other physicists. Or again, today there
vigorous debate over the question whether the mathematical fecundity
of string theory enhances its plausibility as physics.
But now I see that perhaps you are hoping that the scope of such
disagreement is narrow enough that we may, with luck, live at a world
at which each of the sets of standards accepted by various experts will
determine the same set of laws. The laws in Dirac’s Concise Encyclopedia
of Science would be exactly the same as the laws of Bohr’s Concise
Encyclopedia of Science, and so on.
Simplicio. Yes, exactly. Lewis long emphasized (74, 124) that with luck,
any vagueness in our standards of simplicity and of balance will be
irrelevant because all reasonable standards will determine the same
laws at our world. Only later did he note that, with luck, the dependence
of laws on us (via their dependence on our standards) would likewise
evaporate.
Sagredo. I see. Even the intra-species version of this idea is very inter-
esting. I would love to hear more about why you expect the sort of
variation in the standards between scientists that we see at present to
become irrelevant in the limit of complete knowledge of the the distri-
bution of (non-nomic) properties at a world. Perhaps you have some
reason to think that the range of this variation is decreasing over time?
Or perhaps you have some reason to think that although this range
remains constant in time, it tends to make less difference to theory
choice, as time goes on?
Salviati. I suspect that it will not be fruitful to pursue that line of
questioning here.
Sagredo. I see. Well, let us grant, then, that the range of standards used
by human scientists is narrow enough that we can indeed reasonably
hope that, with luck, they will underwrite a unique set of best-system
laws. Now, think what Kant and Peirce would say at this point: a lot
more luck will be required if our laws are to coincide with those of
Martians, given their massive cognitive superiority to us—just as, very
plausibly, the d-laws and the h-laws at our world do not coincide. And
Kant will add: it seems reasonable to assume that there are or could be
types of beings whose cognitive powers outstrip ours to an arbitrary
degree; so no amount of luck could ensure that our laws coincide with
those of each type of space alien.
Simplicio. Perhaps, though, we are lucky, and there are no beings whose
cognitive powers outstrip ours to the required extent?
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Salviati. Perhaps. But that is not relevant to the question of whether
Lewis is a ratbag idealist about laws—we agreed that it sufficed to be a
ratbag idealist if you agreed that, for all you know, there might be other
beings for whom certain (pretheoretically) fundamental facts about our
world differed. And that sufficient condition is met at present.
Simplicio. Well, have it your way then: I suppose that Lewis is a ratbag
idealist about laws. It seems that you think that is an objection to his
account. But it is really more of a matter of taste.
Salviati. I think it is more like an observation. It is not like I think it is
an objection to Kant to label him a ratbag idealist—it just highlights a
feature of transcendental idealism of which he was well aware. Nor do
I think it is any objection to the best-system account of laws to observe
that it renders laws mind-dependent. Lewis himself always seemed
to hope to be able to finesse this feature away. But today, there are a
number of relativist, indexical, or perspectivalist variants of the best-
system account of laws that, to some extent, own up to their ratbaggery.
For me, the point of making the observation is to goad fans of the
best-system approach to take its ratbag idealism fully seriously.
Sagredo. I would be interested to hear more about what you mean by
that.
Simplicio. First, I think it is only fair to let you know that you have
walked into a trap! Let me reveal my real response (inspired by Ned
Hall) to your worries about ratbag idealism. It is that all along you
should have been saying: This is going to hurt me more than it hurts you.
Lewis is a reductionist about laws. A set s of standards of simplic-
ity and balance determine the s-laws at each possible world, where a
possible world is specified by specifying a Humean mosaic, a spatiotem-
poral pattern of instantiation of perfectly natural properties (themselves
non-modal). So for each s, the s-laws at each world supervenience on
non-modal facts at that world.
Lewis’s opponents are non-reductionists: they think that the laws at
a world do not supervene on the pattern of instantiation of non-nomic
properties at that world. Typically, they also buy into a picture on which
the laws govern the pattern of instantiation of fundamental properties.
They think that the laws of a world play a role in determining the shape
of things at that world—whereas reductionists know that it is the other
way around.
Now, all hands should admit that different sorts of beings will use
different sets of standards of simplicity and balance in doing science.
For reductionists about law, this leads to the conclusion that at a
given world, the laws may be species-relative. But that is nothing to
worry about. After all, what is the point of the distinction between mere
true generalizations and laws, by the reductionist’s deflationary lights?
Roughly, the distinction between mere facts and facts that are central
and interesting enough to be targets of scientific investigation. It is no
surprise that different sorts of beings, with different cognitive capacities
and interests, will draw the border between the two sorts of facts in
different places. So it is to the credit of Lewis’s reductionism that it
implies that the laws are to some extent “up to us.”
How do things look to non-reductionists? Given the metaphysical
centrality of laws on their picture, it would be hard for them to deny
that science ought to strive to discover the laws. But now we have to
worry whether our standards of simplicity and balance are the right
ones—among all the kinds of cognizing beings at our world, most will
be using standards that are too lax (leading them to count too many
regularities as laws) or too stringent (leading them to count too few
regularities as laws). Why think that natural selection has equipped us
with the right standards for the goals of science?
This is a pressing challenge for non-reductionists—but for Lewisians,
it can be met trivially, since the scientific goal of a type of being (the
laws-for-them) covaries with their abilities.
Sagredo. That is very interesting! I would like to hear what Salviati has
to say in response—tomorrow.
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Fourth Day
Sagredo. I hope that today we will see whether or not Salviati is able to
escape from Simplicio’s trap.
Salviati. I would like to try! Along the way, maybe I can also enlarge on
something I said yesterday: that to me that point of raising the threat of
ratbag idealism is to push fans of Lewis’s best-system account of laws
to take the account fully seriously. Consider scientific realism.
Simplicio. Gladly—most best-systems enthusiasts are scientific realists,
you know.
Salviati. Are they, though? It is common to identify scientific realism as
involving a semantic component, a metaphysical component, and an
epistemic component: (i) the sentences expressing a scientific theory are
true or false; (ii) very special cases aside, the relevant truth conditions
are mind-independent; and (iii) the empirical success of our theories
gives us (defeasible) reason to think them true.
Simplicio. Humph. Yes. But the sort of mind-dependence involved in
our account of law is not the bad kind.
Sagredo. What is the bad kind?
Simplicio. You should know—the spooky kind. The sort of thing Put-
nam went in for when he wasn’t a scientific realist: “the mind and
the world jointly make up the mind and the world.” He went even
further, you know: “the Universe makes up the Universe—with minds—
collectively—playing a special role in making it up.” Even he admitted
that that last bit was Hegelian. Scandalous. I am glad to say that he
eventually repented.
Salviati. You do concede, though, that your view about laws brings you
into conflict with the metaphysical clause of the characterization given
above?
Simplicio. Yes. But it isn’t important. We just need to tinker with that
clause a bit.
Salviati. Good—I genuinely look forward to hearing more about that. In
the meantime, of course, you can continue to make common cause with
classic and contemporary scientific realists against those anti-realists
who question the epistemic credentials of science. But you will have to
part ways with a realist like Planck, who was deeply concerned with
mind-independence. As you will no doubt recall, the second sentence
of his “Scientific Autobiography” reads:
In this connection, it is of paramount importance that the outside
world is something independent from man, something absolute,
and the quest for the laws which apply to this absolute appeared
to me as the most sublime scientific pursuit in life.
Simplicio. I do recall that. And I recall that his first sentence reads:
My original decision to devote myself to science was a direct
result of the discovery which has never ceased to fill me with
enthusiasm since my early youth—the comprehension of the far
from obvious fact that the laws of human reasoning coincide with
the laws governing the sequences of impressions we receive from
the world about us; that, therefore, pure reasoning can enable
man to gain an insight into the mechanism of the latter.
I am afraid this brings us right back to the trap that I laid for you,
Salviati. Planck is in effect supposing some sort of pre-established
harmony between the principles of human reasoning and the nomic
structure of the world. And it is hard to see how non-reductionists
about laws can do otherwise in the face of the gap that their view sets
up between how we think and how the world is. The beauty of the
best-system account of laws is that it erases that gap, as I was saying
yesterday.
Sagredo. We might almost say that where Planck adopts a preformation-
ist account of human reason, Lewis adopts an epigeneticist one?
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Simplicio. Ha, ha. Very clever—perhaps on this point, Lewis does stand
to Planck as Kant stands to Crusius. I am still waiting to hear how you
are going to get out of the trap that I laid, however.
Salviati. Good. Let us bring causation into the picture. For Lewis, the
causal facts at a world depend on which counterfactual conditionals
are true at that world, and which counterfactual conditionals are true
at a world depends in part on the laws at that world. So Lewis should
be a ratbag idealist about causation as well as about laws. That is an
appealingly weird idea. But not, so far as I can tell, one that Lewis’s
followers have had much to say about.
Simplicio. Cohen and Callender mention that if one adopts their rela-
tivized best-system account laws, it is natural to likewise accept rela-
tivized accounts of causation and chance. They say a bit about how this
looks for a theory of chance.
Sagredo. So you and your friends hold that the world as it is in itself,
is not the sort of thing that is governed by scientific laws or that is
structured by relations of cause and effect, but that the constitution of
the human mind is such that, relative to it, the world has a rich nomic
and causal structure?
Simplicio. You could put it that way. Some of us add that the structure
of space and time also have this status. But it is important to keep in
mind that there is nothing remotely German about any of this.
Salviati. Let us think a bit about all of this looks in the case of causation.
Let us follow Peirce and Kant in assuming that Martians are far more
intelligent than we are. And let us suppose that we are unlucky enough
to find ourselves in a world in which this difference in intelligence, via
the difference it makes to our respective standards of simplicity and
strength, also makes a difference to laws. So there are some regularities
at our world that count as laws for Martians, but not for us. Now, if
you are Lewis—or indeed, anyone who accepts that there is a tight
connection between laws and effective strategies—then you will expect
that there will also be strategies for intervening in the world that
Martians regard as effective strategies but which we do not.
Simplicio. Yes. Different beings with different capacities and interests
will and should draw the line between effective and ineffective strategies
in different places.
Salviati. I am not sure that they always will or that they always should.
Suppose that we come into possession of a piece of Martian technology
that exploits some of these strategies that are Martian-effective but
not human-effective. Now, it does not follow from the difference in
our cognitive capacities that we will be incapable of figuring out the
principles by which this gizmo works—it is just that in working this
out, we will eventually realize that the Martians take as lawful and
counterfactual-supporting some regularity that we consider to be a
mere regularity, one that is excluded from our best-system because
adding it would not yield enough further strength, given its complexity
and our standard of balance between strength and complexity. What
will and should we do if we are interested in having devices that do
what the gizmo does? Change our engineering practices so that we
treat the relevant regularity as counterfactual-supporting, even though
according to our pre-gizmo standards, that would appear most unwise.
Let us consider Simplicio’s trap, then. It is true that anyone who
takes laws to be mind-independent faces a substantive challenge: Why
think that human science is well-adapted to discover the laws of our
world? And it is true that views that take laws to be mind-dependent in
the right sort of way have an easy answer to this question: laws-for-us
are automatically the sort of thing that our science is good at discovering.
But it would be better to say that all accounts of laws of nature face a
double-barrelled challenge: Why think that laws of nature are the sort
of things that we would want our science to discover—and why think
that our science can discover them? Anti-reductionists who assign laws
an exalted metaphysical status may feel that they have a good answer
to the first of these challenges—but as we have just been saying, they
have a hard time with the second. With Lewisian reductionism, it is
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the other way around. On this view, the second part of the challenge
is more or less trivial. But the first part is not: Lewisian reductionists
face the substantive challenge of showing that the notions of simplicity
and balance that we have been equipped with by natural selection align
with our scientific and technological goals. There are real challenges
here for everyone.
Sagredo. Ah, I see. Does it follow that whether or not we have gotten our
hands on Martian technology, we should be open to the idea that our
built-in standards are leading us to systematically under-shoot—that
we may be ignoring lots of effective strategies that are in principle
available to us, because we are being too conservative in determining
which regularities are candidate laws?
Salviati. Yes. Indeed, a natural consequence of Lewis’s view is that
there are regularities that are not good candidates to be laws by our
standards—but which would count as laws for smarter beings. Why
shouldn’t we aim for super-human science and technology—even if
it means using an exchange rate between simplicity and strength that
feels unnatural to us?
Simplicio. The question you raise seems very like an aspect of the
problem of induction to me—you are asking us to justify our choice of
inductive methods. I am really more interested in philosophy of science,
you know.
Salviati. I think that anyone interested in philosophy of science should
be interested, at the very least, in the practical aspects of the problem
of induction. The New Riddle of Induction is nothing but a sharp way
of putting the point that you need some way of selecting which correla-
tions in your data set you expect to hold up as more data come in (since
it is incoherent to expect every correlation to continue to hold). This
is a practical problem for anyone interested in designing autonomous
learning systems. Similarly, the choice between different inductive meth-
ods is a practical problem faced by anyone intending to use machines
to perform super-human scientific tasks—such as identifying patterns
in huge data sets. When we talk about ‘our’ standards of simplicity
and balance, should we be talking about the standards appropriate
for unaided human scientists or for humans with super-computing
prosthetic extensions?
Simplicio. I think I have had enough horror-science fiction for now, thank
you very much.
Salviati. I expect you are not the only one.
Sagredo. Let us leave the pimple-worms for another time, then.
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